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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF U'TAH
In the Interest of
KARL BAILEY
Alleged dependent and
neglected child.

Civil No. 872'2

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
CHILDREN'S SERVICE SOCIETY OF UITAH
STATEMENT OF F AC;TS
We do not agree with appellant's statement of
facts.
On the lOth day of June, 1957, the Juvenile
Court of the Second Juvenile District in and for
Salt L·ake County, State of Utah, after extensive
hearings held on May 14, 16 and 24, 1957, (R. 1-2)
found the minor child, Karl Bailey, born out of
wedlock on January 7, 1955, to Margar~t Susan
Willis, now Sharp, and J. Gordon Bailey (Ex. 7,
R. 221-222), to be a neglected child and the child's
1
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natural father, J. Gordon B·ailey, to be an unfit and
improper person to have the care, custody and control of the child (R. 22-24). The court entered a
decree and judgment by which it terminated all
parental rights of Bailey as natural father of the
child and granted custody of the child to the Children's Service Society of Utah with authorization
to place the child for adoption (R. 25).
The natqral mother, Margaret Susan Willis
Sharp, hereinafter referred to as Susan, had theretofore on January 16, 1957, executed in the juvenile
court a permanent relinquishment of her parental
rights in the child and authorized placement of the
child for adoption ( R. 8) . The juvenile court had
on January 16, 1957, found the child to be an illegitimate and neglected child and entered a decree
permanently depriving Susan of custody of the child
and granting custody of the child to the Children's
Service Society of Utah with right of adoption
placement ( R. 9) .
From the judgment and decree entered by the
juvenile court on the lOth day of June, 1957, finding the child to be a neglected child and the natural
father, J. Gordon Bailey, to be an unfit and improper person to have its custody and control and
granting custody to the Children's Service Society
of Utah with authorization to place the child for
adop'tion, J. Gordon Bailey appeals (R. 27).
2
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S·TATEMENT OF POIN:TIS
POINT I.
TIRE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE AND ADMIT'TED F AC'TS CONCLUSIVELY SHOW THE CHILD
TO BE A NEGLEC'TED CHILD AND APPELLANT 'TO
BE AN UNFIT AND IMPROPER PERSON TO HAVE
ITS CUS'TODY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SEC'TIONS
55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C ..A., 1953.
POIN'T II.
'THE ORDER PERMANENTLY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF CU8TODY OF 'THE CHILD AND AUTHORIZING PLACEMENT OF 'THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS. 'THE
JUVENILE COUR'T FOUND ·THE CHILD TO BE A
NEGLEC'TED C'HILD WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SEC'TIONS 55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C.A., 19'53, AND
TH~T 'THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD REQUIRED
THAT HIS CUSTODY BE TAKEN FROM APPELLAN'T.
1

POIN'T III.
THE JUVENILE COURT FOUND THE CHILD TO
BE THE LEGITIM~TE CHILD OF APPELLANT BY
VIRTUE OF PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMEN·T PURSUANT 'TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTI'ON 78-30-12,
U.C.A., 1953.
POINT IV.
THE :JUVENILE COUR'T DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PROSPECTIVE ADOP'TING PARENTS IN ITHE IN'TERES'T OF
THE CHILD.

STATEMEN'T OF EVIDEN!CE
The evidence and proceedings before the juvenile court on the hearing for the determination of
Bailey's rights in the child were as follows.
3
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Bailey was 'born on December 9, 1921. He was
thirty-five years of age at the time of the hearing.
(R. 211.) He served in the United States Army as
a private for approximately three years from June
of 194'3 'to January of 1946 (R. 214, 245). Thereafter he studied art on the G. I. Bill intermittently
for approximately two and one-half years (R. 245).
Bailey married a Mrs. Martha Bander Singer
in Mexico City, Mexico, on November 19, 1951.
Mrs. Singer was divorced from her previous husband. (R. 92-97, Ex. 1.) Mrs. Singer had a fifteen
year old son from her prior marriage ( R. 99, 293).
Bailey testified that he lived with her approximately
eight months ( R. 9'2) . 'They came to the United
States ( R. 293). Mrs. Singer separated from Bailey
and returned to Mexico under the following circumstan·ces. Bailey did not support her in the manner in
which she was accustomed (R. 99, 293). When she
came to the United States, she had a substantial
amount of money. When she separated from Bailey,
she had to work to obtain the money for her and
her son to return to Mexico. (R. 293.) The son by
the prior marriage could not adjust to Bailey (R.
293-294). Thereafter, unbeknown to Bailey, Mrs.
Singer procured a legal termi11ation of her marriage
to Bailey in a Mexican court on April 5, 1952, -(R.
93-97, Ex. 1). Bailey did not know that the marriage
had been legally terminated until a ye·ar and one4
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half later, sometime after January 4, 1954, when
he received a certified copy of the decree of the
Mexican court terminating the marriage, which certificate was dated January 4, 1954, (R. 93-97, 101,
251~252, 279-280). The decree of the Mexican court
received in evidence was written in Spanish and
translated 'by a Mexican interpreter who testified
that he was not familiar with Mexican law and did
not know whether the document constituted, under
Mexican law, a decree of divorce or of nullification
of the marriage ( R. 97-98) .
Margaret Susan Willis, now Sharp, the mother
of the child, Karl Bailey, was born in Canada and
raised in England (R. 275). She attended the University of London as a student ( R. 320-321). While
she was there, she conceived a child out of wedlock
under unfortunate circumstances from a professor
at the university (R. 275). After conception of the
child, her family carne to the United States in Novem'ber of 1951. 'They resided first at Provo, Utah,
and thereafter in Salt Lake City. Susan gave birth
to that child and placed it for adoption in Denver,
Colorado, with a Red Feather Agency. (R. 32, 275.)
'Thereafter Susan met Bailey at an· artist's
banquet in Salt Lake City in December of 1952 (R.
276). A month later Bailey called on Susan, took
her to his mother's home to have dinner with his
mother, then told her that he wanted to show her
5
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some paintings in another room, took her into his
bedroom and kept her there all night. Bailey had
illicit sexual intercourse with Susan on that occasion. The following morning they had breakfast
with Bailey's mother at the mother's home. (R. 276277.) The following weekend Susan visited Bai'ley
at Logan, where Bailey was attending school on the
G. I. Bill. Bailey had illicit sexual intercourse with
Susan on that occasion. ( R. 227-228.)
Susan at the time was having difficulty with
her parents. ·She told Bailey that she would like to
live with him. Bailey immediately accepted the proposal. Bailey told Susan that he was then married to
Martha Bander Singer, but that as soon as the previous marriage was legally terminated he would
marry Susan. Thereafter in February of 1953 Susan
went to live with Bailey at Logan, Utah, in what,
so far as Bailey knew, was an illegal and adulterous
relationship. (R. 278-279.) Bailey admitted on the
witness stand that he did not receive notice of termination of his prior marriage to Martha Bander
Singer until some twelve months after he comn1enced living with ·susan, when he received the certified
copy of the decree of the Mexican court dated J anuary 4, 1954, (R. 97, 101, 251-252, Ex. 1). Susan's
parents, Mr. and Mrs. David R. Willis, knew Susan
was with Bailey. They thought she was married to
him. (R. 33~34, 180-183, 40-41, 337-338.) Upon
6
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receipt in 19'54 of notice of termination of the prior
marriage, Susan requested that Bailey marry her.
Bailey replied that it was entirely unnecessary, that
marriage was an unimportant function and that
people should be free of the institution of marriage
so they could come and go promiscuously according
to their desires. He therefore refused to marry
Susan. (R. 27'9-280.) Susan's testimony to this effect
was corroborated by her father ( R. 180-183), her
mother (R. 40-41, 337-338), her sister (R. 75-76),
and her brother..:in-law ( R. 50).
Susan and Bailey lived in Logan for two or
three months until April of 1953. Bailey was a student on the G. I. Bill. ( R. 280.) Thereafter from
April of 1953 to June of 1954 they 1ived a vagrant
and itinerant life, in Salt Lake City for three weeks;
in Santa Fe, New Mexico, for four and one-half
months; back in Salt Lake City for three weeks ;
in Santa Rosa, California, for three months; and,
in ·san Francisco, California, for six months. During the entire thirteen month period Bailey was a
student on the G. I. Bill for approximately two and
one-half months while they were in Santa Fe. ·Otherwise he was unemployed and did nothing. Due to
their destitute circumstances Susan obtained employment as an operating room assistant in a hospital in Santa Fe and as an office clerk in San Francisco. She supported both herself and Bailey through7
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out the period. While they were in Santa Rosa, Susan
conceived a child and requested that Bailey procure
medical assistance. Bailey stated that it was unnecessary and refused. Thereafter Susan had a miscarriage. Following the miscarriage Susan hemorrhaged for ·approximately six weeks. She requested
medical attention, but Bailey refused. (R. 281-288,
36, 261-262.)
Susan and Bailey left San Francisco in May
of 1954 and returned to Salt Lake City in June of
1954. They stayed with Bailey's mother for approximately five weeks until Mrs. Bailey forced them
to leave. Thereafter they stayed with Susan's parents
in Salt Lake City for approximately three weeks.
( R. 289-290.) In the meantime Susan had conceived
the child, Karl, who is the subject of this proceeding,
in April of 1954 (R. 290). Susan requested medical
care. They had no money and could not afford it.
Bailey refused to provide medical care for Susan
and the child during the period of conception and
birth on the following g·rounds: that medical care
during child birth is unnecessary; that animals have
their young without medical attention; that he distrusted the medical profession because doctors intentionally infect women with cancer in order to
increase their business incon1e; and, that the latter
is the reason so few women are able to nurse their
children. (R. 290-291.) Bailey admitted on the wit8
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ness stand that he provided no medical care, was
evasive as to his reasons and explained that "if you
have faith you can move mountains" (R. 263-26 7).
Susan and Bailey were destitute at the time they
were in Salt Lake City in June and July of 1954.
Susan was ill and pregnant with the child, Karl.
Susan, because of their destitute circumstances, at
that time procured a job as a night waitress in an
A & W Root Beer stand in Salt Lake City. Bailey
was unemployed and did nothing. (R. 34-35, 289,
291.) Susan at the time was disturbed about her
physical condition, the fact that she could not continue her employment and the coming birth of the
child. She asked Bailey what his intentions were.
Bailey proposed that they travel in a truck, pick up
odd farm jobs along the way, and that the child
could be born in the truck. (R. 291.)
1

Mter conception of the child, Karl, :Susan pleaded with Bailey to marry her so that the child would
not be illegitimate. Bailey refused stating that it
was unnecessary because no child is, "illegitimate
before ·God". ( R. 29'2.)
In August or Septemlber of 1954 Susan and
Bailey procured a job as caretakers at the Burnham
Duck Club, at Bountiful, Utah, ( R. 292, 298). 'The
child was born at the duck club on January 7, 19'55,
(R. 221-222, 298-299). !They remained there for
approxim·a:tely ten months thereafter, until October
1

9
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30, 1955, when Susan terminated the illicit relationS'hip with Bailey and left with the child, Karl, under
the circums~tances hereinafter set forth (R. 309312). Bailey is still employed as caretaker at the
duck club. He works :three months a year during the
duck season from October through December. Otherwise he is unemployed. His total cash income is
$800.00 per year. Quarters at the duck club are
furnished to the caretaker free of charge. (R. 240241, 63-67.) The home in which Susan and Bailey
and the child, after its birth, lived at the duck club
is a sma1l unpainted housE, poorly insulated, exposed
to the outside elements, with meager furnishings, no
wallpaper and insects all over the area (R. 37,
63-64).
T'he following evidence in the r e c o r d as to
Bailey's homosexual and sodomous relationships
and general sexual depravity is uncontroverted.
Susan's testimony as to the facts is corroborated by
the testimony of her sister (R. 75-76), brother-inlaw (Ro 50-51), and her own mother (R. 41-43).
During the time that Bailey was 'living with
his first wife, Martha Bander Singer, Mrs. Singer's
fifteen year old son 'by a prior marriage lived with
them. Bailey insisted, over the boy's o·bjection, in
having sexual intercourse with the boy's mother in
the boy's presence. Bailey told the mother that the
boy had an overdeveloped affection for her, which
10
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Bailey called an "Oedipus Complex". Bailey told
the mother that she should have sexual intercourse
with the boy, her own son, in order to cure this. IThe
mother and son could not adjust to Bailey. As a
result they separated. ( R. 293-294.)
During the period that Bailey was living with
Susan he habitually, over her objection, by the use
of physical force made her submit to sexual intercourse 'by use of the mouth (R. 294-295). During the
period that {Susan and Bailey were staying with
Bailey's sister, Josephine Booth Elliott, in ·san Francisco, Bailey engaged in masturbation with his
sister's thirteen year old daughter and boasted about
it (R. 295). While Susan and Bailey were living
at the duck club Bailey indulged in masturbation
with Susan's twelve year old brother. Susan sent
the brother home. (R. 295-296.) Susan's mother,
Mrs. David R. Willis, required that her children
keep the doors of the Willis home locked and specifically instructed them not to let Bailey in her home
because of his sexual depravity (R. 42-43). Bailey
persistently committed sexual indiscretions upon
Susan's married sister and Susan's seven year old
sister (R. 296, 41-43, 50-51, '76). Bailey on more
than one occasion suggested, that in order to provide
·
f or h1m
· an d Sus.an, Susan ueeame
~ec.am~ a prosti• rl·R-1'4·
Income
tute and he would act as the panderer and get the
business (R. 297). Susan at one time discussed with
11
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Bailey having one of her friends from the University
of London come to live with them. Bailey suggested
that she do so so that the 'three of them could have
sexual relations as a trio. ( R. 298.) Bailey indulged
in masturbation of the infant, Karl, who is t]le subject of this proceeding, while the child was living
with him to a point where he caused sexual stimulus
in the infant and then boasted of having done so
( R. 309). All of the above evidence is positive, direct
and uncontroverted. Bailey did not deny it.
Bailey openly rejected marriage as an institution expressly on the ground that people should be
permitted to freely indulge in promiscuity whenever
and with whomever they desire (R. 50, 75-76, 296297). Bailey rejected religious institutions and
churches on the ground that they are purely man
made. B·ailey does not attend any chureh. (R. 297,
249-2500)
The child, K·arl; was to be born in January of
1955. Susan requested medical care and hospitalization for herself and the child when she expected it
to arrive. Bailey refused and stated that it was unnecessary. ( R. 298.) Susan requested baby clothing
in preparation for the coming child. Bailey stated
that there was no point in buying things for something that did not exist. Therefore, Susan surreptitiously ·held out money that she acquired from cleaning ducks for members of the duck club, bought
12
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clothing for the child and hid it from Bailey. (R.
298-299.) Just prior to birth of the child Susan
suggested that they sterilize the things with which
the child would come in contact. Bailey replied that
sterilization was unnecessary because, if people (in
this case the child that is the subject of this proceeding) are not strong enough to deal with germs,
they should die. (R. 299.)
The child was born at the duck club with only
Susan and Bailey present (R. 221-222, 263, 299300). Susan was in labor from 5:00 a.m. to 11 :00
a.m. Bailey became impatient. (R. 299.) Susan had
sterilized some handkerchiefs and a pair of scissors
for the purpose of severing the umbilical cord. When
the child was born, Susan asked Bailey to unwrap
the scissors from the handkerchief and hand them
to her. Bailey, because of his impatience, picked up
an unsterile pair of scissors and used that for the
purpose of severing the umbi~ical cord. Susan asked
Bailey to hand ·her the sterile handkerchiefs for the
purpose of cleaning the baby. Bailey refused, pulled
an unclean handkerchief out of his pocket and wiped
the baby with it. (R. 299-300.) Mter birth of the
child 'Susan asked Bailey to hand her the baby clothing that she had surreptitiously purchased and hidden in a chest of drawers because she was too weak
to get the clothing herself. Bailey refused, stated
that it was unnecessary, and that she should keep
13
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the child warm as animals do with her body. ;Susan
did just that because she was too weak to do otherwise. ( R. 300-302.)
Susan requested silver nitrate for the child's
eyes and explained to Bailey that the state law requires that silver nitrate be administered at birth
in order to prevent blindness. Bailey refused and
gave his reason that the administration of silver
nitrate causes weakness in children's eyes and is
responsible for so many children having to wear
glasses. As a result no silver nitrate was administered to the child at birth. ( R. 302-303.)
There was no respirator present at the birth
of the child to remove the mucus from his nose and
lungs. As a result the child suffered from prolonged
respiratory difficulty and stopped breathing. Susan
requested medical help. Bailey refused and gave as
his reason that animals or organs that are born imperfect should be left to die if they are going to die
and that the fault of the medical profession is that
they keep alive imperfect human beings and that is
why there is so much illness in the world. (R. 304305.)
'There was no erg·otrate present at birth of the
child for the purpose of contracting the mother's
uterus ( R. 303). After birth of the child, Bailey
kept the placenta in the house for three days and
told Susan that she n1ust eat it, as animals do, in
14
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order to restore hormones to her body that had been
lost during the birth. (R. 303-304.)
Mter birth of the child it suffered from a jaundice condition over a long period of time. Susan requested medical help 'because she was concerned over
the possibility that this condition would cause brain
damage to the child. Bailey, with knowledge that
prolonged periods of jaundice may cause brain damage in infants, refused medical care. ( R. 305-306.)
·The baby suffered from chronic diarrhea for a
period of two months with intermittent fevers. Susan
requested medical help. Bailey replied that she could
get medical care if she could get one of the doctors
who was a member of the duck club to administer it
so that he would not have to pay for the care. Susan
attempted to contact three doctors. 'The first two
were out of town. Bailey refused to permit her to
conta~t the third doctor. Susan again attempted to
contact a doctor, and Bailey told her to seek medical
advice through her sister, who was using a doctor,
so th·at he, Bailey, would not have to pay for it. (R.
306-307.)
Bailey refused to provide vaccination and immunization for the child. He explained that disease
is to be either survived, or not, without medical care.
(R. 308.)
Bailey refused to provide cod-liver oil and vita15
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min supplements for the child as a therapeutic measure. Susan's family provided them. (R. 308.)
Susan's testimony as to Bailey's wilful failure
to provide the child with medical care and his intentional exposure of the child to the dangers inherent
in such neglect is corroborated by the testimony of
Susan's mother (R. 38-40, 39-43), sister (R. 72-75),
and brother-in-law (R. 45-46, 49). That this conduct illegally and dangerously exposed the child to
illness and death, see the expert testimony of Mrs.
David R. Willis (R. 339-343), who has been a registered nurse in both England and the United States
for over thirty years ( R. 43).
After birth of the child Susan again asked
B·ailey to marry her in order to legitimate the child.
Bailey refused and stated that it was unnecessary.
(R. 305).
After birth of the child, due to the destitute
circumstances, Susan begged for old rags, made rag
rugs from them and exchanged the rugs for used
clothing for herself. I-Ier family provided the clothing for the child. ( R. 307-308.)
Between January of 1955 a11d October of 1955
Bailey was unemployed. He did not work and remained arou11d the house all the time. During the
period he became physically violent, beat Susan with
his fists, kicked her and physically abused the child
during periods of impatience to ·a point where ·susan
16
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became afraid and did not leave the child alone with
him. (R. 308-309.) Susan's testimony as to Bailey's
physical abuse of the child was corroborated by her
sister (R. 74).
Bailey had a friend named Jesse Sharp, whom
Bailey had known for ten years ( R. 223) .
'·On Saturday, apparently October 2·2, 1955,
Sharp came to visit B·ailey and stayed at the duck
club with Bailey and Susan through Tuesday or
Wednesday, October 25 or October 26, 1955. The
day after Sharp left Susan commented to Bailey that
she had enjoyed Sharp's visit. Bailey then suggested
that, if Susan wanted to lbe with Sharp, she should
go and live with him. Susan was surprised and
taken back because she thought her relationship with
Bailey was permanent. Sharp was planning to leave
for Cuba. On Saturday, October 29, 19'55, Susan met
Sharp in town. Sharp asked Susan if she were married to Bailey. Sharp then informed Susan that
Bailey had stated that his principal objective was,
on the first opportunity, to dump Susan and the
baby because he, Bailey, was tired of the responsibility. Sharp then asked Susan to marry him and
suggested that she leave Bailey, go live with her
parents, and, when Sharp returned from his trip
to Cuba, they would be married. (R. 309-31'2.)
'Susan and Sharp then returned to the duck
club and told Bailey that they planned to be married.
17
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Bailey specifically suggested that they take the
child, Karl, with them and asked them a'bout their
plans. They told Bailey of the plan for Susan to live
wi;th her parents for about three months and then
get married. Bailey suggested that there was nothing to prevent them from leaving at that time and
getting married immediately. T·hereafter Bailey
loaned 'Susan and Sharp his suitcase for the purpose
of travelling and took them and the child to the bus
station in Salt Lake City so that the three of them
could depart. Susan and S·harp left with the child
the following day and went to Sacramento, California. They were married in Reno, Nevada, on the
way. ( R. 313-314.)
Susan and S·harp had told Bailey that they were
going to Sacramento at the time of their departure.
Ten days later, after they arrived in Sacramento,
they informed Bailey by letter dated November 9,
19'55, and told him that he could reach them by addressing them care of General Delivery in Sacramento. (Ex. 8, R. 231-232, 314.) They stayed in
Sacramento about a month and then went to San
Francis-co. Sharp had difficulty adjusting to the
child, Karl, so Susan returned to her family in Salt
Lake City two weeks later for the purpose of getting
them to care for the child for a short time while
she and Sharp were becoming adjusted. (R. 314315.)
18
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In the meantime by letter, dated November. 9,
1955, Susan informed her parents, Mr. and Mrs.
Willis, for the first time that she was not married
to Bailey because, at first, Bailey stated that he had
a prior marriage that had not been terminated and,
later, because after termination of the prior marriage, Bailey refused to marry her (R. 180-183, 315316, 337-338). Mrs. Willis confronted Bailey with
the contents of the letter. Bailey did not deny it.
(R. 337-338.) At the same time Mr. Willis learned
tha:t Bailey had actively assisted Susan and Sharp in
departing and that Bailey knew of th~ir whereabouts after their departure ( R. 178).
Susan returned to the home of 'her parents in
Salt Lake City in December of 1955. Bailey met
'Susan there. Susan in front of her parents confronted Bailey with the fact that he had not maintained
her, that he had never worked during the time that
she had known him and that, although she had asked
him to marry her on many occasions, he had persistently refused to do so. Bailey did not deny the accusations. ;See the testimony of Susan ( R. 316-317) ,
Mr. Willis (R. 182-183), and Mrs. Willis (R. 837338).
In the middle of January of 1956, Susan and
the child left the Willis home and moved into an
apartment preparatory to the return of Sharp from
Californ'ia (R. 316-317). 'Thereafter Bailey wrote
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a letter to Susan and Sharp and requested of Susan
a reconciliation even though Bailey knew that in the
meantime Susan had married Sharp. Sharp replied
by letter postmarked February 2, 1956, (Ex. 11)
and told Bailey to quit bothering them. (R. 2'36238.) Bailey testified that, after receipt of this
letter from Sharp, he did not make any further inquiries concerning, or attempts to learn of the whereabouts of, the child Karl ( R. 240).
The record shows conclusively that during the
period from October 29, 19'55, when Susan and the
child left with Sharp down to February of 1956,
Bailey knew the whereabouts of Susan and the child
or facts from which he could have ascertained their
whereabouts. He did not at any time during the
period contribute to the support of the child. (R.
316-317.) Bailey told Sharp's sister that he consented that Susan leave with Sharp because Sharp
was in a better position to care for the child than
Bailey (R. 168-169). Bailey told Mrs. Alice Olson,
case worker for the Children's Service Society of
Utah, in a conversation three weeks prior to the
date of the 'hearing in this matter that he had not
contributed to the support of the child because he
knew Sharp had $800.00 at the time Susan and the
child left, was employed, and was able to care for
the child ( R. 57-58). The record shows conclusively
that from the time of receipt of the letter from
iit
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Sharp, postmarked February 2, 1956, telling Bailey
to quit bothering them down to the time of the hear~
ing in this matter, Bailey made no further inquiries
concerning the child, or attempts to learn of its
whereabouts, and that he did not support it ( R.
57-58, 168-169, 240, 317).
On February 9, 1956, Susan placed the child in
the care of the Children's Service Society of Utah
on a temporary basis pending adjustment of her
marriage with S·harp (R. 55, 85, 318). She was
prompted to do so because Sharp could not adjust
to the child, Karl, they were not getting along, she
was desperate and felt that it was necessary in the
child's best interest (R. 318). At the time of the
placement Susan 'informed the Children's Service
Society that the child was born of a previous illicit
relationship ( R. 85) . She misrepresented both the
date of birth and the identity of the natural father,
J. Gordon Bailey. S'he did so because she was afraid
of Bailey and expressed concern to the representatives of the Children's Service Society over any possibility that the child would come in contact with,
or un·der the influence of, its father because of the
father's sexual depravity. (R. 55-56, 69-70, 347349.) The Children's 'Service Society at the time of
the placement in February of 1956 made an investigation of the record~ of the Bureau of Vital Statistics of the State Health Department to ·ascertain
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the correct birth date of the child and the identity
of the father, but was unable to obtain the information be.cause Susan had misrepresented both the birth
date and the father's identity. (R. 69-70).
At the time of the placement the ehild was suf..
fering from a severe allergy and respiratory infection. The Children's Service Society immediately
place·d the child in the care of Dr. Fis·hler, pediatrician for the society. 'The child, then over one year
old, received his first medical care. (R. 56-57, 7879.)
Thereafter Susan went with Sharp to California. She did not contact the Children's Service
Society again, except for two short telephone conversations, until some ten months later on November
21, 1956. (R. 58.) In the meantime the Children's
Service Society placed the child with excellent foster
home parents ( R. 327-330, 349-350). On November
21, 1956, Susan came to the Children's Service Society and had a conference with Mrs. Virginia Lee
Bennett and Mrs. Alice Olson, executive secretary
and case worker respectively, for the society. In the
conference she explained th·at her husband, Sharp,
from whom she had in the meantime had another
child, could not despite her efforts adjust to the
child, Karl, and that for that reason she did not
want the child. ( R. 58.)
Thereafter on December 7, 1956, proceedings
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were con1menced in the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake
County for the purpose of terminating Susan's parental rights and procuring authorization to place
the child, Karl, for adoption ( R. 4-5, 58). A hearing
was held in the matter on December 10, 1956, (R.
5, 58-59, 87-88). Susan appeared at the hearing
and testified that the child was born out of wedlock
and, for the first time, disclosed the true birth date
of the child, January 7, 1955, and the identity of
the natural father, J. Gordon Bailey, (R. 6, 59, 8788) . Susan at the hearing stated that she desired an
opportunity to adjust her affairs and to determine
whether or not she could possibly provide care for
the child and requested that the court give her a
little time in which to determine whether or not
she could do so ( R. 6, 30). The court, therefore,
found the child to be a neglected child and ordered
the case continued to January 16, 19'57, (R. 6-7,
30). Susan appeared in the juvenile court on J anuary 16, 1957, and executed a voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights in the child, advised the
court that the child was born out of wedlock and illegitimate, and consented to placement of the child
for adoption ( R. 8, 30). The court thereupon entered
a decree by which it adjudicated the child to be the
illegitimate child of Susan, terminated :Susan's parental rights, and granted custody of the child to the
C·hildren's Service Society of Utalh with authorization to place the child for ·adoption ( R. 9, 30).
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Three days later on January 19. 1957, the
Children's Service Society was advised 'by its counsel that, in view of the fact that Bailey had lived
with Susan and the child at the duck club for some
time after its birth and in view of the provisions of
Section 78-30-12, U.C.A., 1953, pertaining to legitimation of children by public acknowledgment, proceedings should 'be commenced against Bailey in the
juvenile court for the purpose of determining Bailey's rights, if any, in the child and for the purpose
of terminating any parental rights that Bailey might
have in the child on grounds of neglect (R. 59, 88).
Bailey at tha:t time was in California and was not
due to return to the duck club at Bountiful, Utah,
until sometime in March of 1957 (R. 59, 88). Bailey
it will be recalled had last been in contact with Susan
and the child a year before in February of 1956 (R.
236-238). In the interval B·ailey ·had made no inquiries concerning the wefare of the child, had not
attempted to determine its whereabouts and had
not supported it (R. 68, 240, 316-317).
Bailey in the meantime had met a Mrs. Lee
Deffebach Hanson sometin1e in May of 1956 (R.
195). About a month and ·a half later, sometime in
July or August of 1956, Bailey and Lee Deffebach
commenced living openly in an illicit and adulterous
relationship at the Burnham Duck Club at Bountiful, Uta'h, (R. 104-106, 196, 206). Lee Deffebach
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had met her husband, Glade Ballard Hanson, apparently sometime in 1955. One month later she married
him. Thereafter she and Hanson went to Europe
where Lee Deffebach Hanson was an art student
on a Fulbright scholarship. They separated in Europe, and Hanson returned to the United States. (R.
190-191.) Thereafter 'Lee Deffebach Hanson returned to New York City where she was a charity patient
for sometime in a New York hospital (R. 192, 208).
Thereafter Mrs. Hanson returned to Salt Lake City
in May of 1956. She met J. Gordon Bailey at that
time. (R. 195.) Approximately one month later
Glade Ballard Hanson sued Mrs. Hanson for, and
was awarded an, interlocutory decree of divorce on
June 12, 1956. Mrs. Hanson did not contest the proceedings. (R. 106, 191.) She explained that the
reason her marriage to Hanson was not successful
was because Hanson was homosexual (R. 192). She
testified, as did Susan in Susan's case (R. 278),
that she entered into the adulterous relationship with
Balley because, on her returning home and getting
the divorce, she was having difficulty with her
parents (R. 196). Bailey admitted on the witness
stand that he lived with Susan in what so far as he
knew was an adulterous relationship from 1953 to
1954 (R. 251-252) and in an illicit relationship
from 1954 through October of 1955, and that thereafter he lived with Lee Deffebach in an adulterou·s
25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

relationship from July or August of 1956 through
December of 1956 (R. 251-255). Bailey was a man
thirty-five years of age at the time of the hearing (R. 211). His explanation was that he lived with
both women in adulterous and illicit relationships,
over his own objection, but that he finally gave in
and lived with Susan because of her insistance and
with L~e Deffe'bach because "he considered it very
important to her health" that he do so. (R. 251-255.)
Lee Deffebach's divorce from Hanson became
final on December 12, 1956, (R. 106, 191). She
and Bailey were married on December 14, 1956,
(R. 197).
Mrs. Virginia Lee Bennett had known Lee
Deffebach since 1945 as a childhood acquaintance
of one of the wards of the Children's Service Society
(R. 201-202). Mrs. Bennett knew that Lee Deffebach was staying at a place known as the Burnham
Duck Club in the summer of 1956 because Mrs.
Bennett contacted her there by telephone ( R. 80).
Mrs. Bennett did not know at the time that Lee
Deffebach was living in an adulterous relationship
with J. G~rdon Bailey (R. 78-91), and Mrs. Bennett
did not know that J. Gordon Bailey was the father
of the ,child, Karl, until after the hearing in the
juvenile court on December 10, 1956~ when Susan
disclosed the fact (R. 84-87). On December 13 or
14, 1956, Mrs. Bennett received an announcement
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that Lee Deffebach and Bailey were married. On
December 27 or 28, 1956, Lee Deffebach informed
Mrs. Bennett that she and Bailey were leaving for
California and that they would not return for two
or three months. (R. 81.) On January 19, 1957,
after Susan's parental rights in the child had been
terminated, the Children's Service Society of Utah
was advised by its counsel that a hearing should be
held for the purpose of terminating any rights that
Bailey migh·t have in the child on grounds of neglect
(R. 59, 88).
Bailey returned from California in March of
1957 (R. 59, 88). In April of 1957, the Children's
Service Society contacted Bailey for the purpose of
procuring a release of any rights that he might have
in the child and his consent to its adoption (R. 5'9-60,
88). Thereafter Bailey had a conversation with Mrs.
Virginia Lee Bennett and Mrs. Alice Olson at the
Children's Service Society on April 22, 19'57, and a
subsequent conversation with Mrs. Olson on May 7,
1'957, (R. 60, 64-65).

In the conversations Bailey expressed open ap-R.A·t't'
proval of his illicit relationship with Susan (R.
60-61, 82). He stated that he learned about human
beings from his observations of, and his deductions
from, the actions of animals particularly cattle. He
explained 'Susan's difficulties in the following language. That Susan was like a cow that has been de27
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prived of a calf. That such a cow, which he called
a "leppy", becomes very promiscuous and will not
take care of its young. That Susan's parents had
forced her to give up her first child conceived in
England. That as a result Susan had become very
promiscuous and in consequence thereof had lived in
a promiscuous relationship with him, Bailey, and
thereafter left Bailey to be with Sharp. (R. 60-61,
8'2.)
From 1943 to 1957 Bailey has engaged in no
steady gainful employment except three years in
the army as a private and his employment for three
three years as caretaker at the duck club at which he
works three months a year (R. 66-67, 245-248).
In the conversations he told Mrs. Olson that he did
not believe in providing for the child's future security ( R. 325). He stated that he actively assisted
Susan and the child in leaving with Sharp and that
he did not thereafter support the child (R. 57-58,
68). He .stated that 'he was still in love with Susan,
even though he had since married Lee Deffebach
( R. 61-62, 83), and suggested that, if the child were
returned to him, he and Susan would be reunited.
He did not explain what he intended to do with Lee
Deffe!bach, whom he had in the meantime married,
or what should be done 'vith Sharp, to whom Susan
had become married, and Susan's and Sharp's child
( R. 65-66) . Bailey stated that he would not volun28
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tarily consent to the adoption of the. child, but that
he would not resist any legal proceedings ( R. 62,
81).
\The child had been placed in a foster home
fifteen months prior to this time. The foster home
parents, with whom the child has over the period
established mutual ties of love and affection and
whose financial, moral and other qualifications are
without question, had applied to the Children's Service Society for adoption of the child. The Children's
'Service Society has approved the foster home parents
as adoptive applicants for the child. It has not,
of course, given final approva1 for adoption of the
child by them. (R. 327-330, 334, 349-350.)
On April 30, 1957, a petition was filed in the
Juvenile Court of Salt Lake County for the purpose
of determining Bailey's rights, if any, in the child
as its natural father, terminating all parental rights
of J. Gordon Bailey on grounds of neglect and obtaining authorization for the Children's Service Society to place the child for adoption. The petition
alleged as grounds of neglect the following: that
J. Gordon Bailey had abandoned the child; that the
child lacked proper parental care by reason of the
fault, habits and immoral conduct of J. Gordon
Bailey; that Bailey had neglected and failed to provide the child with subsistence, medical and other
care necessary to the child's health, morals and well1
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being; that the child was in a ·dangerous situation
to its health and morals by reason of the conduct of
J. Gordon Bailey. (R. 10.) Summons and notice
expressly stating that the hearing was for the purpose of permanently depriving Bailey of his rights,
if any, in the child and for the purpose of granting
custody of the child to the Children's Service Society of Utah with authorization to place the child
for adoption was served on Bailey twelve days prior
to the date of the hearing (R. 17). Extensive hearings were held in the matter on May 14, May 16, and
May 24, 1957, (R. 1-2). On June 10, 1957, the juvenile court entered its findings of fact, conclusions
of law and decree in the matter. It expressly found
the child to be a neglected child, J. Gordon Bailey
to be an unfit and improper person to have its custody. and control and that the best interest of the
child required that its custody be taken from J.
Gordon Bailey because of his fault, habits and manner of living. The court by its decree terminated
all parental rights of J. Gordon Bailey and granted
cus~tody of the child to the Children's Service Society
of Utah with authorization to place the child for
adoption and authority to complete adoption of the
child by the prospective adopting parents. (R. 2225.) The court, in finding the child to be a neglected c'hild, expressly found facts showing the following. (1) That Bailey had abandoned and know30
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ingly neglected the child in that he had voluntarily
assisted Susan and t~e child in leaving with Sharp
because he .no longer wanted -responsibility for the
child and that he did not thereafter contribute to
the sup·port of the child, although he knew of the
whereabouts of the child or facts from which he
could have ascertained its whereabouts from the
approximate time that Susan and the child separated from him on October 30, 195'5, to February of
1956, and that thereafter he did not make any effort
to determine the whereabouts of the child and did
not contribute to its support. (2) That Bailey knowingly and intentionally failed to provide the child
with subsistence, medical and other care necessary
to the child's health, morals and well-being in that
Bailey knowingly and intentionally failed to provide necessary medical and other care for the child
during the pregnancy, birth and post confinement
and during prolonged periods that the child suffered
from diarrhea accompanied by fever, jaundice and
bronchial difficulty thereafter. ( 3) That the child
lacked proper parental care and was in a situation
dangerous to its health and morals by reason of the
fault, habits, conduct and manner of living of J.
Gordon Bailey. (R. 22-25.)
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ARGUMENT
POIN'T I.
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE AND ADMITTED FACTS C·ONCLUSIVELY SHOW THE CHILD
TO BE A NEGLE·C'TED CHILD AND APPELLANT TO
BE AN UNFIT AND IMPROPER PERSON 'TO HAVE
ITS CUSTODY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SE·CTIONS
55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953.

Section 55-10-6, U.C.A., 1953, defines the words
"neglected child" to include the following:
"A child who is abandoned by his parent, * * *.
'' A child who lacks proper parental care
by reason of the fault or habits of the parent,

* * *
"A child whose parent * * * neglects
or refuses to provide proper or necessary
subsistence, education, medical or surgical
care or othe·r care necessary for his health,
morals or well-being.

* * *
"A child * * * who associates with vagrant, vic'ious or immoral persons.
"A child who * * * is in a situation * * *
injurious to the health or morals of himself
or others."
Section 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, provides as.
follows:
"No child * * * shall ·be taken from the
custody of its parents * * * unless the court
shall find from the evidence introduced in
the ·case that such parent * * * has knowing32
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ly failed and neglected to provide for such
child the proper maintenance, care, training
and education ·contemplated and required by
both law and morals * * * or unless the court
shall find from all the circumstances in the
case that * * * the welfare of a child requires
that his custody be taken from its parents

* * *."

!The uncontroverted evidence shows the
following. That Bailey persistently indulged in sodomous and homosexual relationships, is gui'lty of general sexual depravity and that this conduct was
visited on three children, ages 12, 13 and 15 respectively, and on the child that is rthe subject of this
proceeding during the period that it was living with
Bailey. That Bailey lived openly in what, so far as
he knew, was an aduTterous and in an illicit relationship with Susan and as a result this child was
born. Tha;t eight months after the relationship with
Susan was terminated, Bailey openly entered into
an adulterous and illegal relationship with Lee Deffebach. Bailey did not deny the sodomous and homosexual relationships and the general sexual depravity
and offered no evidence that his traits in these respects have changed. Bailey did not deny the 'illicit
and adulterous relationships and offered as his only
excuse that he did so, in the case of one woman, because of her insistence, and, in the case of the other,
'because he "considered it very important to her
hea1th" that he do so. Wherther or not these women
( 1)
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consented to live with Bailey in these relationships
is immaterial to the proceeding before this court,
except to the extent that it shows Bailey's lac'k of
character as a proper custodian for this child by
virtue of his association with them. Susan's testimony that Bailey openly rejected marriage as an
insrtitution 'because he believed that people should
be free to ·come and go promiscuously according to
their desires and to the effect that he persistently
refused to marry her, in spite of her pleadings for
the legitimacy of the child, is corroborated by four
witnesses ( R. 75-76, 50, 180-183, 279-280). It is
submitted that by virtue of the foregoing the child
is a neglected chi'ld within the meaning of the second,
third, fourth and fifth paragraphs above quoted
from ·Section 55-10-6, U.C.A., 1953, in that (1)
the child lacks proper parental care by reason of the
fault and habits of J. Gordon Bailey, (2) J. Gordon
Bailey has neglected and refused to provide the
child with care necessary to tl1e child's health, morals and well-being, (3) the child, to the extent that
Bailey claims any interest in it as its natural father,
is, within the literal wording of the statute, associated with a vagrant, vicious and immoral person
and ( 4) is in a situation dangerous and injurious
to the child's health and morals.
IThat evidence of illicit relationships and immoral habits and conduct, coupled with neglect and
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failure to provide a child with proper subsistence,
medical and other care for the child's health, morals
and well-being, does support a finding that the child
is a neglected child and that the parent is unfit to
have its custody, within the meaning of Sections
55-10-6 and 55-10-32, U.C.A., 195'3, see, In re Br~ad
ley (1946) 109 U. 538, 167 P.2d 9'78, and, In re Olson
(1947) 111 U. 365, 180 .P.2d. 210. That open profession of belief in illegal and adulterous relationships
and exposure of a child to such relationships does
constitute the child a neglected child and the parent
unfit, see, In re State in Interest of BZack (1955)
3 U.2d 315, 283 P.2d 88'7. That exposure of a chi1d
to brutal and sadistic treatment does constitute the
child a neglected child and support a finding that
the parent is unfit, see, In re Miller (19'52) 40
Wash.2d 319, 24·2 P.2d 1016.
1

(2) The admitted facts show the following.
That Bailey knowingly and intentionally neglected
to provide the child with proper and necessary medical care during the period of conception, at birth
and thereafter down to the date of the hearing in
this matter. Bailey's only excuse was that he claimed that Susan consented to this course of conduct
during the period that she lived with him. Susan's
positiv~ testimony to the effect that she requested
necessary medical care during the period of conception and at birth and during the periods of prolonged
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and serious illness of the child thereafter and as to
Bailey's diabolical reasons for refusing such care
,,
is corroborated by the testimony of three witnesses
(R. 38-40, 39-43, 72-7'5, 45-46, 49). Again, whether
or not Susan consented to this course of conduct is
not material to this proceeding except to the extent
that it shows Bailey's lack of character as a fit custodian for this ·child by virtue of his association with
her. Furthermore, Susan's testimony as to Bailey's
personal conduct in wilfully exposing the child to
dangers of disease, iTlness and death during the period of conception, at birth and thereafter, of itself,
supports a finding that the child is a neglected child.
Bailey's only excuse for failing to provide medical
care for the child after his illicit relationship with
Susan and the child was terminated and down to
the date of the hearing in this matter was that he
did not know the whereabouts of the child. The positive evidence shows that Bailey knew the_ whereabouts of the child during the first four months
after Susan and the child left with his assistance
and that, thereafter, Bailey did not inquire as to the
child's whereabouts or welfare. It is submitted that
the admitted facts as to failure to provide this child
with proper and necessary medical care constitute
the c·hild a neglected child within the meaning of
the third paragraph of Section 55-10-6, U.C.A.,
1953, a'bove set forth.
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T·hat failure to provide a child with proper and
necessary medical care, coupled with other evidence
of irresponsible conduct, does sup·port a finding that
the child is a neglected child within the meaning of
Sections 55-10-6 and 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, see,
In re Br~adley (1946) 109 U. 5'38, 16'7 P.2d 978,
in which the evidence of medical neglect did not approach the flagrance of tha;t in the case before this
court.
(3) The uncontroverted evidence and admitted facts show the following. Bailey actively assisted
Susan and the ·child in terminating the illicit relationship with Bailey and leaving with S·harp. For
a period of four months thereafter Bailey knew of
the whereabouts of the child or of facts from which
he could have ascertained its whereabouts. Bailey
did not during the period contribute in any manner
to :the care and support of the child. At the expiration of this four month period Bailey wrote a letter
to Susan in which he requested resumption of Bailey's and Susan's relationship, even though in the
meantime Susan had married Sharp. Sharp in February of 195'6 responded to the letter and told Bailey
to quit bothering them. Thereafter Bailey made no
inquiries concerning the child or its whereabouts
and welfare and did not provide for its care and
support down to the time of the hearing in this matter. Bailey told Mrs. Alice Olson, case worker for
8'1
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the Children's Service Society of Utah, in a conversation three weeks prior to the date of hearing
that he had not contributed to the support of the
child since ·susan and the child left with S'harp because he knew Sharp had $800.00 at the time, was
employed and was able to care for the child (R.
57-58) . Bailey told Sharp's sister that he consented
that Susan leave with Sharp because Sharp was in
a !better position to care for the child than Bailey
( R. 168-169) . It is submitted that the foregoing
constitutes the child a neglected child within the
meaning of the third paragraph of Section 55-10-6,
U.C.A., 1953, a'bove quoted to the effect that a neglected child includes, ''A child whose parent * * *
neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary
subsisten·ce, education, medical or surgical care or
other care necessary for his health, morals or wellbeing." See, In re Bradley (1946) 109 U. S38, 167
P.2d 978, and In re Olson (194'7) 111 U. 365, 180
P. 2d 210, so holding. In the Bradley case the mother
left the child with the mother's aunt for a period of
four months without providing care and support or
arranging for such care and support. In the Olson
case the father permitted the child to remain with
its maternal grandparents and aunt and did not
provide ·care because he believed the grandparents
were providing adequate care and did not provide
financial suppo]}t because the grandparents did not
38.
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request it. In both cases the court held the children
involved to be neglected children within the meaning
of Sections 55-10-6 and 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953. It
is no answer that Bailey left the child in the care of
its mother, Susan. Bailey was his father. As such,
to the extent that Bailey claims any interest in the
child born of an illegitimate relationship, he had
an independent duty to provide parental care and
support. Instead he actively assisted Susan and the
child in leaving with Sharp and thereafter knowingly and intentionally neglected to provide subsis~tence and ,care for the child.
( 4) The evidence further shows the following.
Both before and after birth of the child :susan pleaded with Bailey to marry her for the purpose of
legitimating the child. Bailey persistently refused
and openly rejected marriage as an insti:tution because he !believed that people should be free to live
in promiscuity according to their desires and because
"no child is illegitimate before God". Susan's positive testimony to this effect is corroborated by four
witnesses (R. 40-41, 50, 75-76, 180-183, 337-3'38).
Bailey affirmatively suggested that Susan leave him
and go and live with Sharp. Bailey told Sharp
that Bailey's principal objective was to dump 'Susan
and the child because he did not want the responsilbility. Bailey affirmatively suggested that Susan
and ·sharp take the child with them and actively as39'
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sisted them and the child in departing. For a period
of four months thereafter Bailey knew the whereabouts of the child and did not contribute to its
support. Thereafter Bailey did not inquire concerning the whereabouts of the child or its welfare and
did not contribute to its support down to the time
of the hearing. It is submitted that the foregoing
evidence supports a finding tha:t the child, born out
of wedlock, was abandoned by its natural father
within the meaning of the first paragraph of 'Section
55-10-6, U.C.A., 1953, which defines a neglected
child to include, ''A child who is abandoned by his
parent * * *.'' Although the meaning of the word
"abandoned" as used in Section 55-10-6, U.C.A.,
1953, has not been defined by this court, there is
no question that under admitted facts of this case
the child is a neglected ch:lld within the meaning of
·both 'Sections 55-10-6 and 55-10-32. See, In re Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 16'7 P.2d 978, at page 983.
1

1

( 5) Appellant asserts that ~by reason of the
fact that the evidence shows that the child was in
the care of a third party, to-wit, the Children's
Service Society of Utah from and after February
9, 1956, down to the date of the hearing in this
matter and by reason of the fact that appellant did
not know the actual physical location of the child
during this period, 'the child could not have been a
neglected child on the date of the hearing. (Appel40
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lant's brief, pp. 7-9, 21-22, 31-32, 44-45.) 'The evidence conclusively shows the following. That appellant actively assisted 'Susan and the child in leaving
with Sharp on October 30, 1955. That appellant
did not thereafter support the child because appellant thought that Sharp was in a !better position
than appellant to do so. 'That appellant knew the
whereabouts of the ·child or facts from which he
could have ascertained its whereabouts for a period
of four months after Susan and the child left with
Sharp down to February of 1956 and that, upon receipt of a letter from Sharp in February of 1956
teTlirig appellant to quit bothering 'Susan and Sharp,
appellant did not thereafter inquire concerning the
welfare and whereabouts of the child and did not
contribute to its support. That such conduct does
constitute present neglect of the child, see, In re
Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 167 P.2d 978, and In
re Olson (1947) 111 U. 365, 180 P.2d 210. In the
Olson case the fa:ther claimed that because the child
was receiving adequate care and support from its
grandparents at the time of the hearing, the child
was not then a neglected child. The court said at 180
P.2d pp. 213-214:
'''The contention t h a t the petition
fails to state facts sufficient to show neglect
on the part of appellant to support his minor
child, assumes that there are aTlegations
which negative parental neglect by showing
41
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that the child has been and is now being well
cared for by the grandfather and maternal
aunt. The petition states that since 1938 appellant as father of Judith has failed to provide support or training for her, and that
her grandparents have been caring for her.
* * * An allegation that other relatives or
friends provide care for a child neglected by
a parent, does not negative the averment that
a parent has neglected his parental responsibilities.
''By specifying that the words 'neglected
child' include a child 'whose parent, guardian
or custodian neglects or refuses to provide
proper or necessary subsistence, education,
medical or surgical care or other care necessary for his health, morals or well-being' the
statttte seeks to reach the person who is primarily responsible for the care and support
of the child. The fact that some third person
may be providing care for a child by reason
of neglect of the parent to do so, does not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction to inquire into the welfare of such child and to
fix responsibility and determine custody for
the child within the scope of the statutory
authority granted to the court." (Emphasis
added.)
Appellant asserts that evidence of appellant's
past immorality and misconduct during all periods
that the child was with appellant and for prolonged
periods thereafter does not constitute evidence that
the child was a neglected child and appellant an unfit and improper person to have its custody at the
42
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time of the hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-22,
31-32, 44-45.) The evidence as to appellant's immorality and misconduct showed that it persisted
during all periods that the child was with appellant
and for prolonged periods both before and after that
time. It was positive, direct and uncontroverted.
Appellant did not deny it and offered no evidence
that his traits in this respect had changed at the
time of trial.
Appellant cites In re State in Interest of Johnson (1946) 110 U. 500, 175 P.2d 486, and In re
Miller (19'52) 40 Wash.2d 319, 242 P.2d 1016, as
authority for the proposition that evidence of prior
immorality and misconduct on the part of a parent
will not support a finding that the child is a presently neglected child and that the parent is an unfit
and improper person to have the custody of the child
at the time of the hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp.
20-2:2, 44-45.) In the Johnson case it was alleged
in the petition that the parent, in the future, would
be unable to provide support and care for the child.
The supreme court held that an allegation that the
mother in the future would be unable to support
and care for the child did not constitute an allegation of the present status of the c;hild as a dependent
child within the meaning of Section 55-10-6, U.C.A.,
1953. The court in so holding said that, if the petition had alleged that prior to the filing of the petition
43
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the mother had not properly supported the child,
the allegation would have been sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the juvenile court on ground of present dependency within the meaning of the statute.
IThe court said at 175 P.2d p. 489:
"The petition does not allege that Billy
was homeless or destitute or without proper
support or care through no fault of his parent.
All it says along this line is that the
mother is financially unable to provide a fit
and proper home for said child. This is not
an alleg~ation of the present status of the child,
but is ~an attack on the ability of the mother
in the future to look after him. For all that
the petition alleges we do not know but that,
up to the time of the filing of the petition, the
mother had properly supported the baby."
(Emphasis added.)
In the Miller case the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the juvenile court in permanently
depriving the father of his rights in the child because the father had previously treated the child
in a brutal and sadistic manner. That evidence
of past immorality, misconduct and irresponsibility
on the part of a parent is admissible on the issue of,
and will support a finding of, present neglect of a
child and unfitness of a parent to have its custody,
see also, In re Bradley (1946) 109 U. 538, 167 P.2d
978, and In re Olson (1947) 111 U. 365, 180 P.2d
210.
44
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POIN'T II.
THE ORDER PERMANENTLY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF CUS'TODY OF THE C;HILD AND AU'THORIZING PLACEMENT OF THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS. THE
JUVENILE COUR'T FOUND THE CHILD 'TO BE A
NEGLECTED CHILD WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTIONS 55-10-6 AND 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, AND
THAT THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD REQUIRED
THAT HIS CUS'TODY BE TAKEN FROM APPELLANT.

Section 55-10-3'2, U.C.A., 1953, so far as material to the point under consideration, provides the
following:
''No child * * * shall be taken from the
custody of its parents * * * unless the court
shall find from the evidence introduced in the
case that such parent * * * ( 1) has knowingly failed and neglected to provide for such
child the proper maintenance, care, training
and education contemplated and required by
both law and morals * * * or unless the court
shall find from all the circumstances in the
case that * * * (2) the welfare of the child
requires that his custody be taken from its
parents * * *.''
Appellant asserts that because the juvenile
court did not insert the word "knowingly" in its
findings of fact showing that appellant, not only
knowingly but intentionally, failed and neglected
to provide for the child proper maintenance, care,
training and education contemplated and required
by both law and morals, and because the juvenile
45
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court did not insert the word "welfare" in its express finding that the best interest of the child required that his custody be taken from appellant
that, therefore, the findings do not meet the requirements of Section 55-10-32, U.C.A., 1953, and do not,
therefore, support the judgment of the court permanently depriving appellant of custody of the
child and authorizing placement of the child for
adoption. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-42.)
The juvenile court expressly found facts showing the following. ( 1) That appellant abandoned
and knowingly neglected the child in that he voluntarily assisted Susan and the child in leaving with
Sharp and that he did not thereafter contribute to
the support of the child although he knew of the
whereabouts of the child or facts from which he could
have ascertained its whereabouts from the approximate time that Susan and the child separated from
him on October 30, 1955, to February of 1956, and
that thereafter he did not make any effort to determine the whereabouts of the child and did not
contribute to its support. (2) That appellant knowingly and intentionally failed to provide the child
with subsistence, medical and other care necessary
to the child's health, morals and well-being in that
appellant knowingly neglected to provide for the
child as in ( 1) above set forth and in that appellant
knowingly and intentionally failed to provide neces46
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sary medical and other care -for the child during
the pregnancy, birth and post confinement and during prolonged periods that the child suffered from
diarrhea accompanied by fever, jaundice and bronchial difficulty thereafter. (3) That the ·child lacked
proper parental care and was in a situation dangerous to its health and morals by reason of the
fault, habits, conduct and manner of living of appellant. 'The juvenile court also expressly found
the following ultimate facts. ( 4) That the custody
of the child should be taken from appellant because
of his fau'rt, habits and manner of living and ( 5)
that the best interest of the child required that
appellant be deprived of his custody. The latter two
findings were s.et forth in the court's conclusions of
law.
IThat a finding of ultimate fact set forth by
the court 'in its conclusions of law has the legal effect
of a finding of fact, see, Consolidated W~agon &
Machine Co. v. ~ay (1933) 81 U. 595, 2'21 P.2d
836.- That the failure of the court to insert the word
"knowingly" in its findings of fact showing that
appellant knowingly and intentionally failed and
neglected to provide the child with proper maintenance and care contemplated and required by both
law and morals and that the failure of the court
to insert the words ''welfare of the child" in its
express finding that the custody of the child should
47
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be taken from appellant because of appellant's fault,
habits and manner of living and in its express finding and that the best interest of the child required
that appellant be deprived of the child's custody, was
not error and did not invalidate the findings, see,
In re Miller- (1952) 40 ¥/ash.2d 319, 24'2 P.2d 1016.
In the Miller case the Washington statute defined a
dependent child as a child, "whose home, by reason
of neglect, cruelty or depravity of its parents or
either of them is an unfit place for such child * * *."
The juvenile court found the children were dependent ,children in that the father was a brutal and
sadistic person and in that he was not a fit and proper person to have the care and custody of the children. The father appealed from the judgment of the
juvenile court permanently depriving him of custody
of the children and claimed that the judgment was
not supported by the findings because the court did
not insert in the findings an express provision to
the effect that the children's "home was an unfit
place for such children." The Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed the judgment of the juvenile
court permanently depriving the father of custody of
the children and held that, although the statute defining a dependent child required the juvenile court
to find that the "home of the child was unfit", it
was not necessary that the juvenile court insert the
express words, "that the home was unfit" in its
findings. The court said at 242 P.2d p. 1018:
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"While the juvenile court did not, in the
above quoted findings, sp.ecifically state that
the home w~as an unfit place for these children, we think that is to be inferred from the
findings relative to the unfitness of the father and mother to have the custody of their
children." (Emphasis added.)
Appellant asserts that because the juvenile
court found that the mother of the child testified
to certain facts as to appellant's immorality, intentional neglect of the child and misconduct (which
t stimony wqs no1t co[1ntrodverted) the cou.rt did not,.. _,
@Re-lo~ee. ..p,ncJ "i:n e..
•JI ~~ be. II- ~eqle~'l-~d- qk, Ia.
~ QxpressJy :tg~,__n faets Sfl0 VVIHg 'that tne ehtld
(Appellant's brief, pp. 22-26, 46-48.) 'The juvenile
court expressly found facts showing that the child
was a neglected child by reason of the fault, habits
and misconduct of appellant and by reason of appellant's abandonment of the child and by reason
of appellant's intentional neglect to provide the
child with proper and necessary maintenance and
care contemplated 'by both law and morals. The fact
that the juvenile court further found that the mother
of the child testified (which testimony was uncontradicted) to certain additional facts as to appe'lllant's immorality, intentional neglect of the child
and misconduct does not mean that the juvenile
court failed to find the child to be a neglected child.
We concede that the findings, made and entered by
the juvenile court, were not artfully drawn. That
this does not result in reversible error, see, In re

~

7
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Clift's Estate (1927) 70 U. 409, 260 P. 859, 867,
where the court said :
"Other errors of a technical nature are
assigned as to the findings. While some of
the findings are not in artistic form according to approved models, neverthless, they indicate clearly the mind of the court. Such assignments are therefore without merit."
Furthermore, if it were assumed for purposes
of argument only that the juvenile court's findings
were defective, the error could not have prejudiced
appellant because the uncontroverted evidence and
admitted facts conclusively show the child to be a
neglected ehild and appellant to be an unfit and
improper person to have its custody. That the failure of a trial court to find against an appellant on
material issues does not prejudice the appellant and
is not reversible error, where the uncontroverted
evidence is against the appellant on those issues,
see: Parowan Meroantile Vo. v. Gurr (1934) 83 U.
463, 30 P.2d 207; Piper v. Hatch ( 1935) 86 U. 292,
43 P.2d 700; In re Miller (1952) 40 Wash.2d 319,
242 P.2d 1016; and, In re Johns.on (1931) 50 Idaho
573, '300 P. 492.
In Parow~an M ercant·ile Co. v. Gurr the appellant claimed that the failure of the trial court to
find on a material issue, to-wit, whether or not
there was consideration for the promissory note
sued on, rendered the judgment void and required
50
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reversal by the supreme couflt. The Supreme Court
of Utah affirmed the trial court and held, that since
the evidence conelusively showed that there was
consideration for the note, the failure of the trial
court to find on that issue could not have prejudiced
appellant and was not, therefore, reversible error.
The court said at 30 P.2d p. 210:
"We have, however, reviewed the pleadings and the evidence set forth in the transcript. We are satisfied that had the trial court
made specific findings on all issues, material
or otherwise, presented by the answer no finding would have been permissible other than
such as would support the judgment. We are
therefore of the opinion that the error, if
any, did not affect any substantial right of
the defendant."
In the Miller case the father, on appeal from
the judgment of the juvenile court permanently depriving him of custody of his children, claimed that
because the findings of the juvenile court were general findings to the effect that the father was a
brutal and sadistic person and not fit to have the
custody of the children they did not constitute findings of fact and did not, therefore, support an adjudication that the children were dependent children.
'The Supreme Court of Washington held that, since
the facts as to the misconduct of the appellant were
not controverted, the appellant was no't prejudiced
by the omissions in the findings and the case was
51
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not, therefore, subject to reversal on that ground.
The court said at 242 P.2d p. 1018:
"However, our examination of the relatively short record indicates that the basic
facts are not in serious dispute. Relators have
therefore not been prejudiced because of the
general nature of the findings, and, accordingly, we would not be warranted in reversing on that ground.''
POIN'T III.
'THE JUVENILE COURT FOUND THE CHILD TO
BE THE LEGITIMA'TE CHILD OF APPELLAN'T BY
VIRTUE OF PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT PURSUANT TO 'THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 78-30-12,
U.C.A., 1953.

Appellant asserts that the juvenile court found
that the child was the illegitimate child of appellant and that the child was not legitimated by appellan~t's acknowledgment of the child as his own.
From this appellant concludes that the juvenile
court, therefore, treated the case as a habeas corpus
action and not as an action in the interest of the
child for the purpose of determining whether the
child was a neglected child and whether appellant
was a fit person to have its custody. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 13-19.)
Both assertions by appellant are incorrect and
contrary to the record. ( 1) The court expressly
found in its findings of fact that appellant and the
child's mother lived openly as man and wife with
the child at the duck club, which was appellant's
52
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home, from the time of birth of the child on January
7, 1955, to October 30, 1955. The court in its conclusions of law expressly adjudicated that the child
may be considered to be the legitimate child of appellant because of recognition of said child as his
son by J. Gordon Bailey. (2) The case was not
treated as a habeas corpus action. The action was
'instituted in the juvenile court, entitled ·state of
Utah in the interest of Karl Bailey, and the entire
proceeding was conducted for the purpose of determining whether or not the child was a neglected
child and whether or not appellan t was a fit and
proper person to have its custody.
1

Furthermore, there is no logical connection between appellant's unsupported assertion that the
juvenile court did not find the child 'to have been
legitimated by appellant's acknowledgment of the
child and appellant's unsupported conclusion that,
therefore, the juvenile court treated the case as a
habeas corpus action and not as a proceeding in the
interest of the child.
If it were assumed for purposes of argument
only that the juvenile Court .did find the child to be
an illegitimate child and not to have been legitimated
by appellant's acknowledgment of the child as his
son, the error could not have prejudiced appellant
because the uncontroverted evidence and admitted
facts conclusively show tha:t the child is a neglected
53
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child and that appellant is an unfit and improper
person to have its custody.
We do not concede, by virtue of the foregoing,
that the juvenile court was necessarily correct in
finding that the ·child was the legitimate child of
appellant by reason of appellant's recognition of
the child as his son. Section 78-30-12, U.C.A., 1953,
provides the following:
"The father of an illegitimate child, by
publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such with the consent of his wife,
if he is married, into his family, and otherwise
treating it as if ·it were a legiti'lJUlte child,
thereby adopts it as such, and such child is
thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of its bir'th." (Emphasis added.)
It might well be ·held, as a matter of law, that
appellant did not "otherwise treat the child as if
it were a legitimate child'' in view of the fact that
ap·pellant persistently refused to marry the chi1d's
mother, while he was living with her as man and
wife, in spite of her pleading that he do so in order
to legitimate the child. Susan's tes'timony to this
effect is corroborated by the physical circumstances
of a mother of an illegitimate child, the testimony
of four witnesses and Bailey's evasive testimony on
the stand.

54
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POINT IV.
THE JUVENILE COUR'T DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PROSPECTIVE ADIOP'TING pARENTS IN 'THE INTEREST OF
THE CHILD.

Appellant asserts that the juvenile court erred
in admitting evidence concerning the prospective
adopting parents and in authorizing the Children's
Service Society to complete adoption of the child
on the following ground. That the juvenile court is
a court of limited jurisdiction. That the sole question
before the ·court was whether the child was a neglected child. IThat the juvenile court is not an adoption court. \T·hat, therefore, admission by the court
of evidence that some fifteen months prior to the
hearing the child had been placed in a foster home,
that natural ties of love and affection had developed
'between the child and the foster parents, that the
foster parents had applied for adoption of the child,
that the Children's Service Society of Utah had approved the qualifications of the foster parents as
adoption applicants, and that the foster parents
were qualified to adopt the child was error, and that
the juvenile court's finding of the above facts and
grant of custody to the Children's Service Society
of Utah with right of adoption placement and with
authorization to complete adoption of the child by
the foster parents was error. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 33-39.)
55
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'This suggestion ignores the fact that the
primary purpose of the hearing was the best interest
and welfare of the child and· that any evidence
bearing on that issue was admissible under the provisions of Section 55-10-'26, U.C.A., 1953, which
provisions expressly authorize the juvenile court
in all cases relating to delinquency, neglect and dependency of children to, "adopt any form of procedure * * * which !t deems best suited to ascertain
the facts * * * and to make a disposition in the best
interests of such children * * *," and expressly require the juvenile court to, "inquire into the home
environment, history, associations and general condition of such children * * *.''
( 2) This suggestion further ignores the provisions of Section 55-10-43, U.C.A., 1953, which
provisions expressly authorize and require children's
aid societies to report the facts as to adoption placements to the juvenile court and the juvenile court,
based on the evidence presented, to pass upon the
qualifications of the adoption applicants and, if it
deems it advisable, to authorize completion of the
adoption by the applicants.
( 1)

(3)' !The evidence that, during the fifteen
month period, natural ties of love and affection had
been established betwee11 the child and the prospective adopting parents and as to the latters' qualifications was further admissi'ble on the following
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ground. Bailey had actively assisted Susan and the
child in leaving with Sharp on October 30, 1955,
under circumstances considerably more flagrant
than the average abandonment. He had persistently
refused to honor Susan's pleas that he marry her
in order to legitimate the child. During the four
month period thereafter down to February of 1956
he knew of the child's whereabouts and did not contribute to its support. From February of 1956 down
to the time of the hearing in this matter he did not
inquire concerning the welfare of the child or its
whereabouts and did not support it. In the meantime in February of 1956 the Children's Service
Society placed the child in the home of the foster
parents, and over 'the fifteen month period natural
ties of love and affection were established between
them. The damage to the emotional stability of the
child that would result from severance of that relationship would be the direct result of Bailey's misconduct, intentional neglect of the child and irresponsibility. It was clearly within the province of the
juvenile court to ·hear and consider the evidence in
the best interest of the child.
Appellant asserts that the admission of evidence concerning the prospective adopting parents
and the order of the juvenile court authorizing placement of the child for adoption violated due process
because appellant did not 'have notice that one of the
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issues at the hearing would be authorization to place
the child for adoption. (Appellant's brief, p. 42.)
Appellant did have notice that the purpose of the
hearing was the best interest and welfare of the
child. Furthermore, the summons and ndtice served
on Bai1ey twelve days prior to the hearing expressly
stated that the purpose of the ·hearing was to permanently deprive J. Gordon Bailey of his parental
rights, if any, in the child and to grant custody of
the child to the Children's Service Society of Utah
with authorization to place the child for adoption.
(R. 17.)

Furthermore, if it were assumed for purpose
of argument only that the juvenile court erred in
admitting the evidence concerning the prospective
adopting parents, the error could not have prejudiced appellant because the uncontroverted evidence
and admitted facts show the child to be a neglected
child and appellant to be an unfit and improper
person to have its custody.
Respectfully submitted,
McBROOM & HANNI,
Attorneys for Respondent,
C·hildren's Service Society of Utah.
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